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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DARNELL L. GARCIA, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12994 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal brought by the plaintiff-appellant, 
State of Utah, from an order arresting the judgment, dis-
missing the case, and exonerating the respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The respondent, Darnell LeRoy Garcia, was convicted 
of Burglary in the Second Degree on May 18, 1972, before 
Judge Calvin Gould in the District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah. On May 26, 1972, Honorable 
Calvin Gould arrested the judgment and dismissed the 
case because he believed the respondent was denied equal 
protection of the laws. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment which 
arrested respondent's conviction, and also seeks an order 
reinstating the Court's judgment of May 18, 1972, which 
found respondent guilty of Burglary in the Second De-
gree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of March 10, 1972, Edna Hardy, the 
Assistant Director of the Bertha Eccles Art Center, was 
awakened by loud talking (T. 9). Mrs. Hardy lives in 
the Art Center and is responsible for the house and 
grounds (T. 5). She went to her window and observed 
two men who were ducking from automobile lights (T. 
9) . When she heard the office window break, she tele-
phoned the police (T. 10). When the police cars arrived, 
Mrs. Hardy saw one figure jump from the office window 
(T. 10, 16). While the officers did not actually see anyone 
inside the building, there was sufficient evidence to show 
that someone had been inside (T. 61-62). Although Mrs. 
Hardy could not identify which defendant had leaped 
through the window (T. 16), the respondent told Marlin 
Balls, an Ogden City police officer, that he had been in 
the building and that there had been no one else inside 
except himself (T. 47). 
When Officer Watts of the Ogden City Police De-
partment drove up, he saw the co-defendant Randall Rob-
ert Houle walking approximately ten feet from the build-
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ing (T. 37). Mr. Houle was apprehended immediately 
(T. 37), and arrested by Officer Watts (T. 32). 
After apprehending Mr. Houle, Officer Watts told 
Officer David M. White that there was someone else in 
the building (T. 39). Officer Watts then heard glass 
break, and observed Officer White hurrying towards that 
area (T. 39). Officer White also heard the glass break, 
and he observed a man leap from the building, hit the 
ground, and then run north towards Officer Balls (T. 
24). Officer Balls saw the respondent running towards 
him, and commanded him to stop (T. 42). Officer Balls 
apprehended the respondent and placed him in custody 
(T. 43-44). Respondent told Officer Balls that he had 
"just screwed up a little bit," and that he was "high" (T. 
4A) . "He said when you are high, man, you will steal 
anything" (T. 44). Respondent testified that he had told 
the officer that he cut his leg while going through the 
window (T. 59). 
The co-defendants were charged with Second Degree 
Burglary (R. 1) . However, Houle's charge was dropped 
and he was allowed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor 
of Trespass (R. 6). The respondent was not afforded the 
opportunity to enter a plea to a lesser charge (T. 3). 
Apparently, there were two main reasons why the charge 
was reduced to one co-defendant and not the other: 1) 
There was different evidence concerning each of the de-
fendants at the Preliminary Hearing (T. 3). 2) There 
was a strong difference in previous criminal records con-
cerning the two defendants, and there were other circum-
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stances which lent themselves 'wwards reducing one charge 
and not the other (T. 66). The Respondent had been 
previously convicted of burglary, while Houle did not have 
a serious prior record (T. 59-60, 66). 
The Judge, Honorable Calvin Gould, sitting without 
a jury, found the respondent guilty of Burglary in the 
Second Degree (T. 62). Later, the court arrested re-
spondent's conviction under the doctrine that he had 
been denied equal protection by the "executive branch" 
which includes the District Attorney's office (T. 72). The 
court believed that the men were similarly situated (T. 
72), and decleared that defendants who are similarly 




THE COURT ERRED IN ARRESTING RE-
SPONDENT'S CONVICTION BECAUSE OF 
AN ALLEGED DENIAL OF EQUAL PRO-
TECTION. 
There is heavy case authority maintaining the posi-
tion that respondent's conviction for Second Degree Bur-
glary should not have been arrested. In the alternative, 
appellant could not find a single authority which would 
suggest an arrest of respondent's conviction. 
The leading case of Newman v. United States, 382 
F. 2d 479 (D. C. Cir. 1967), is very similar to the instant 
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case. In Newman, the appellant's co-defendant was al-
lowed to plead guilty to misdemeanor of petty larceny, 
a lesser included offense under the indictment, while the 
United States attorney refused to grant the same plea 
for the appellant. The court held that there was no denial 
of appellant's constitutional rights. Newman held that 
the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department 
and he may exercise his discretion as to whether or not 
there shall be prosecution in a particular case. The opin-
ion stated that courts are not to interfere with the prose-
cutor's discretion: 
. . . the courts are not to interfere with the free 
exercise of the discretionary power of the attor-
neys of the United States in their control over 
criminal prosecutions. Id. at 481. 
There is a presumption that the prosecutor will exercise 
his powers consistent with his oaths. Id. at 482. "It is 
not the function of the judiciary to review the exercise 
of the executive discretion ... " Id. S'ee also United 
States v. Taylor, 448 F. 2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1971). " ... no 
court has any jurisdiction to inquire into or review his 
decision." Newman, supra, at 482. The executive depart-
ment "has abundant supervisory and disciplinary powers 
- including summary dismissal - to deal with miscon-
duct of their subordinates." Id. "A case is not to be sum-
marily dismissed because the court disagrees with some 
policy of the District Attorney's office." Id. at 481. In 
Newman, the arguments of defense were the same as the 
instant case (See Id. at 480), but the court held that the 
conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is 
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not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Id. Rather, 
the court stated the following: 
Myriad factors can enter into the prosecutor's de-
cision. Two persons may have committed what 
is precisely the same legal offense but the prosecu-
tor is not compelled by law, duty or tradition to 
treat them the same as to charges. On the con-
trary, he is expected to exercise discretion and 
common sense to the end that if, for example, one 
is a young first offender and the other older, with 
a criminal record, or one played a lesser and the 
other a dominant role, one the instigator and the 
other a follower, the prosecutor can and should 
take such factors into account; Id. at 481-482. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The decisions in the Newman opinion are backed 
with strong support. Hutcherson v. United States, 345 
F. 2d 964 (D. C. Cir. 1965), stated that the choice of 
applicable statutes for indictment and prosecution should 
be made by the prosecutor, and the defendant has no con-
stitutional rights in the election. The prosecutor has com-
plete control over the proceedings and may exercise his 
discretion. Even if there has been an indictment, a dis-
trict attorney has broad powers in dismissing or entering 
nolle prosequi in a criminal case. See State v. Hensley, 
53 N. M. 308, 207 P. 2d 529 (1949). 
In State v. Andrews, 165 N. W. 2d 528 (Minn. 1969), 
the court held that a prosecutor is entitled to the pre-
sumption that he has acted fairly in the discharge of his 
official functions. A difference in charges made against 
co-defendants does not give rise to a presumption of dis-
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crimination. Id. The defendant has the burden of proof 
in an alleged denial of equal protection and he must show 
i..ntentional and purposeful discrimination. Id. The court 
stated: 
A record that is at best obscure as to the nature 
of the prosecutor's decision and that is wholly 
silent as to the considerations which motivated 
such decision falls far short of meeting the challen-
ger's burden of proof. Id. at 533-534. 
In People v. Winters, 342 P. 2d 538 (Cal. App. 1959), 
there was a presumption of the prosecutor's fairness and 
the burden of proof was upon the defendant; the court 
then declared that it was an abuse of discretion for a 
municipal judge, without a hearing, to hold that there 
had been a deliberate or intentional unequal enforcement 
of the laws, and that the judge could be disqualified at 
the insistence of the plaintiff or the defendant. Id. 
Winters, stated that the basic question in crim-
inal prosecution is whether the defendant is guilty, not 
whether there are other lawbreakers who have escaped 
detection and punishment. The court held that the fol-
lowing principle is clearly and properly established: 
It is not a denial of equal protection that one 
guilty person is prosecuted while others equally 
guilty are not. Id. at 545. 
See also State v. Reichenberger, 182 N. W. 2d 692 (Minn. 
1970). Equal Protection does not mean equal enforcement 
of the law. It does not mean that "if some guilty persons 
escape, others who are apprehended should not be prose-
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cuted." lVinters, supra. at 544. In Winters, the court 
noted that the remedy for unequal enforcement of the 
law "does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the 
expense of society." Id. A Southern California Law Re-
view article gives good coverage of the subject. Prosecu-
torial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 
42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 519 (1969), declares that it is unattain-
able to have a standard which treats all people the same. 
Id. at 541. It further states that: 
The equal protection clause does not dictate that 
failure to prosecute certain individuals should nul-
lify valid criminal laws and allow admitted viola-
tors to avoid prosecution. Id. at 538-539. 
Miss Rita James, appointed amicus curie, pointed out 
that by not fully prosecuting an offender of the laws, it 
is actually the people who suffer; that when the co-defen-
dant pleads to a lesser offense, the people bear the burden 
and the respondent is not any worse off (T. 70). 
In Sanders v. Waters, 199 F. 2d 317 (10th Cir. 1952), 
the District Court for Oklahoma found no merit to the 
contention that equal protection is violated because some 
defendants with prior convictions were prosecuted under 
the habitual criminal statute and some were not. The 
court stated: 
The fact that indictments or informations do not 
always charge a violation of the habitual criminal 
statute where the accused has had prior felony 
convictions, does not affect the validity of the 
statute. Id. at 318. 
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In State v. Hicks, 325 P. 2d 794 (Or. 1958), the court 
found that there had been a laxity in the enforcement of 
the law, but the courts held that mere laxity is not and 
cannot be held to be a denial of equal protection of the 
law. A violation of equal protection would require the 
following: 
... yet, if it is applied and administered by public 
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, 
so as practically to make unjust and illegal dis-
criminations between persons in similar circum-
stances, material to their rights, the denisJ of eq_ual 
justice is still within the prohibition of the con-
stitution. Id. at 803. (Emphasis added.) 
Before equal protection is denied by discrimination, there 
must be proof of an intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion. State v. Anderson, 159 N. W. 2d 892 (Minn. 1968); 
See also Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Crim-
inal Complaints, supra. There must be a showing of de-
liberate discrimination between persons in similar circum-
stances based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification. United States 
v. Alarik, 439 F. 2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1971), at 1350-1351. 
Miss J arnes, amicus curie, distinguished Oyler v. 
Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 82 S. Ct. 501, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1962), 
from the present case. She said, "it would seem that we 
do not have exactly the same situation we have here" (T. 
67). She further stated: "I don't think Oyler comes right 
out and tells us this is tantamount to a denial of equal 
protection" (T. 67). Oyler, supra, allows a conscious ex-
ercise of selectivity in enforcement. This selective en-
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forcement is permissible unless it is based upon an un-
justifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbi-
trary classification. Id. at 453. 
In State v. Anderson, supra, there were 59 charges 
made under the city ordinance while only 7 were prose-
cuted under state law. The court held that there is no 
discrimination until there is proof that the facts and cir-
cumstances in all the cases were similar, and that there 
is no reasonable ground for the exercise of selectivity. The 
court mentioned that the reasonable grounds for greater 
leniency might exist because of a first offense, a person's 
background, or some other reason. Id. at 894. For an 
example of leniency due to circumstances see Reichen-
berger, supra at 696. State v. Gamelgard, 177 N. W. 2d 
404 (Minn. 1970), discusses acceptable reasons for len-
iency and the use of prosecutor's discretion: 
The court recognized that there are numerous and 
various factors which enter into the determination 
of culpability and sentence, such as degree of cul-
pability, prior record, and degree of cooperation 
with the prosecutor and correctional authorities. 
Id. at 407. (Emphasis added.) 
The increasing of authorized punishment of prior offend-
ers is constitutional. See Epperson v. United States, 371 
F. 2d 956 (D. C. Cir. 1967). To facilitate the heavier 
punishment of a prior offender, the courts are eager to 
help the prosecution in his discretion: 
The courts will not skimp in affording the prose-
cution an opportunity to obtain and appraise the 
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prior record of the accused in order to determine 
whether to seek a felony conviction. Id. at 958. 
Sufficient evidence is an important factor influencing 
the prosecutor's discretion to prosecute. If it is the prose-
cutor's opinion that the law or evidence does not justify 
the prosecution of a case, he may refuse to institute action. 
See Perry v. State, 181 P. 2d 280 (Old. 1947). 
In October of 1971, United States v. Taylor, 448 F. 2d 
1280 (4th Cir. 1971), found no abuse of the prosecutor's 
discretion, nor violations of equal protection when a con-
federate who had assisted in a get-away and supplied a 
gun, was charged with a misdemeanor while the appellant 
was convicted of a felony and was serving his 15 year 
sentence. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v. 
Verdugo, 79 N. M. 765, 449 P. 2d 781 (N. M. 1969), found 
no violation of a conspirator's rights even though the con-
spirator was serving his sentence for conspiracy, while an 
entry of nolle prosequi was entered as to the other alleged 
conspirators. While claiming that there was no merit to 
the appellant's argument, the court stated: 
Certainly it takes two or more to effect a conspir-
acy, State v. Deaton, 74 N. M. 87, 390 P. 2d 966 
(1964), but conviction of all conspirators, or even 
more than one, is not required. Ordinarily, the 
entry of a nolle prosequi as to other alleged con-
spirators does not vitiate the conviction of a re-
maining defendant charged with conspiracy with 
them. Id. at 782. 
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In the instant case, the respondent had a prior felony 
conviction while his co-defendant had no serious prior 
record. The prosecutor had a problem with the evidence 
concerning the co-defendant, and there were other cir-
cumstances which led the prosecutor to accept the co-
defendant's plea to a lesser charge (T. 3, 77). The co-
defendant was allowed to plead to a lesser charge through 
well founded reasons based upon prosecutorial discretion 
(T. 3, 66). Even after the attack by the defense, the 
state's attorney stated: "However, I have no intentions 
of maldng a Motion to reduce or dismiss the charges after 
discussing the case" (T. 67). After discussing the case 
with the prosecutor, the state's attorney, Mr. Neeley, 
believed that the two defendants were not similarly situ-
ated, and that the prosecutor's actions were most appro-
priate (T. 69-70). The defense has failed in meeting the 
burden of proof and in overcoming the presumption of 
the prosecutor's fairness. The court below erred in not 
respecting the prosecutor's properly exercised discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, the respondent's 
arrested conviction should be reinstated. The prosecution 
properly exercised its discretion in charging the co-defen-
dants with different crimes. The burden of proof is upon 
respondent to show discrimination, and the respondent 
has failed to meet his burden of proof. The lower court 
erred in arresting the judgment and exonerating the re-
spondent. Firstly, because it is not the function of judi-
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ciary to review the exercise of the executive branch. And 
secondly, because the prosecutor did not abuse his discre-
tion. The order of the lower court must be reversed, with 
directions to reinstate the judgment convicting respon-
dent with Burglary in the Second Degree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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